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    1. Competitive ride-sourcing markets with a third-party integrator

      時間:2021-01-04         閱讀:


      主題Competitive ride-sourcing markets with a third-party integrator

      主講人香港科技大學 楊海教授

      主持人工商管理學院 肖峰教授


      直播平臺及會議ID騰訊會議會議ID:830 319 414

      主辦單位:工商管理學院 科研處


      Prof. Hai Yang is currently a Chair Professor at The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. He is internationally known as an active scholar in the field of transportation, with more than 260 papers published in SCI/SSCI indexed journals and a SCI H-index citation rate of 60. Most of his publications appeared in leading international journals, such as Transportation Research, Transportation Science and Operations Research. Prof. Yang received a number of national and international awards, including Frank M. Masters Transportation Engineering Award, American Society of Civil Engineers (2020); National Natural Science Award bestowed by the State Council of PR China (2011). He was appointed as Chang Jiang Chair Professor of the Ministry of Education of PR China; Prof. Yang served as the Editor-in-Chief of Transportation Research Part B: Methodological from 2013 to 2018 and is now a distinguished editorial board member of this prestigious journal.

      楊海教授,香港科技大學講座教授,國際交通領域知名學者,發表SCI/SSCI論文超過260篇,SCI H-index指數60。其中大多數成果發表在Transportation Research,Transportation Science和Operations Research等國際頂級期刊上。楊教授曾獲國內外諸多獎項,包括2020年ASCE運輸工程獎章、2011年國家自然科學獎等,曾任教育部長江學者講座教授,并在2013-2018年擔任《Transportation Research Part B: Methodological》主編,現為該期刊杰出編輯委員會成員。


      With the rapid development of shared mobility, third-party integrators have emerged recently to integrate competitive platforms that offer on-demand ride services in ride-sourcing markets. With platform integration, a passenger can request a ride through the integrator and can be matched with an idle driver affiliated to any of the integrated platforms, whichever is first or closer. As a result, passengers can access a higher level of supply, generating a thicker market with shorter average matching and pickup times. More importantly, platform integration maintains a competitive environment in which the participating platforms still set their prices, wages, and other operating strategies independently. In this talk, mathematical models are described to characterize the Nash equilibrium of the ride-sourcing market with multiple competing platforms and compare market outcomes with and without platform-integration. It is found that platform-integration can increase total realized demand and social welfare but may not necessarily generate a greater profit when vehicle supply is sufficiently large or/and market is too fragmented.